I. Introduction
Every month, with the help of statisticians throughout the Federal Reserve System, Board staff estimate how much consumers owe on their automobile loans, credit cards, student loans, boat loans, and other personal loans not secured by real estate. Such loans, which at present total over $2 trillion, represent a significant portion of total consumer indebtedness.
1 Board staff also estimate the terms and prices of some categories of loans, calculating the average interest rates consumers are paying and, for automobile loans, the average maturity and amount financed. All of these estimates are published in a consumer credit statistical release called the G.19.
The G.19 is the most widely used and cited measure of nonmortgage consumer credit. It helps economists forecast demand for consumer goods and services, gauge consumer optimism about the future, calculate household debt service levels, and model consumer credit markets. The G.19 also helps investors, providing them with a measure of the health of the consumer lending sector, an indication of the fastest growing consumer credit segments, and an understanding of the extent to which lenders are using structured finance products, such as asset-backed securities, to finance growth. G.19 data also help researchers seeking to study consumer reliance on debt, understand popular loan terms and pricing, and support various consumer lending policy positions.
For those with an interest in the credit card industry, the G.19 is of particular importance.
Its revolving credit estimate is one of the best publicly available measures of the broad credit card market, indicating the rate at which the industry is expanding or contracting. The estimate also provides insights into consumer attitudes toward card borrowing, indicating, for example, how aggressively consumers use credit card debt to finance holiday spending. The G.19's data on credit card interest rates are also important and are probably the most representative available.
These data provide card industry researchers and participants with valuable information about how interest rates are affecting the price of credit card credit.
Despite the G.19's central role in research, policymaking, and industry analysis, few of those who rely on it are likely to understand how its estimates are derived. This paper describes how the G.19 currently measures the size of the revolving credit market, which primarily comprises loans made through credit and charge cards. We focus our attention on the revolving credit statistic because of its importance to the credit card industry and credit card consumers. We also find this statistic of particular interest given the volume of recent research on the effects of significantly increasing levels of revolving and largely unsecured consumer debt.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section II explains how Board staff estimate a monthly total of revolving credit for U.S. consumers. Specifically, the Board analyzes the source data, sampling methods, and calculations on which the estimate relies. Section III proposes a framework for analyzing the revolving credit statistic and suggests five modifications to how the estimate is calculated and presented. Section IV concludes that while it may be possible to improve the usefulness of the revolving consumer credit statistic, the present method of estimation is accurate and reliable.
II. Revolving Consumer Credit in the U.S.
The Federal Reserve's monthly estimate of total consumer revolving credit outstanding, which is typically made available on the fifth business day of each month, comprises six segments: commercial banks, finance companies, credit unions, savings institutions, nonfinancial businesses, and pools of securitized assets. The first five segments represent the various types of organizations that can issue credit cards. These organizations offer different products and operate in different regulatory environments. Commercial banks offer a wide range of financial services, including lending and banking services, and are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), a state banking regulator, or some combination of these regulators. Finance companies can make loans but cannot take deposits, and they are regulated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and state agencies. Credit unions take deposits and make small loans, but they can serve a group of consumers only within a specific community. They are typically regulated by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) or state agencies. Savings institutions, which include thrifts and savings banks, offer a wide range of banking services and are usually regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the FDIC, state banking agencies, or some combination of these regulators. In most cases, a nonfinancial business is an entity that sells goods or services to consumers and offers revolving credit to customers in connection with this retail business. Nonfinancial businesses may be regulated by state entities and, if publicly traded, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
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The sixth segment, pools of securitized assets, refers not to a type of organization that issues credit cards but to a method of holding credit card loans. These loans have been sold by the card-issuing organization to a special purpose entity (SPE) that in turn has issued bonds backed by these loans to investors. 3 Card-issuing organizations do not report securitized card loans on their balance sheets because, in theory, these loans are no longer assets of the card issuer. In practice, card issuers continue to "manage" the accounts associated with these loans by providing customer service, producing and mailing statements, and collecting payments. All of the organizations mentioned above, with the exception of credit unions, sell credit card loans to SPEs. As a result, the credit card loans that these organizations report on their balance sheets are not representative of all of the card loans they actually "manage." This sixth segment captures loans held by SPEs that would otherwise not be measured using the on-balance-sheet data historically available from card-issuing organizations.
Because four of the five card-issuing organizations discussed above securitize their card loans (credit unions do not), Board staff actually gather data on nine different loan types (e.g., onbalance-sheet commercial bank, off-balance-sheet commercial bank, etc.). This section describes how Board staff estimate all nine of these types of credit, and it is organized by type of lender.
The information contained in this section comes from interviews with Board staff that prepare the G.19 and our own analysis of the data that underlie the G.19.
Two challenges facing those estimating revolving consumer credit are generally outside the scope of this paper. The first challenge involves making estimates before source data become Board staff estimate commercial banks' total on-balance-sheet loans by summing the two fields described above across all unique, nonsavings-bank entities that file Call Reports. To derive a list of unique entities, Board staff must remove subsidiaries that, because of a "parent" entity's filing, report overlapping loan amounts. In 4Q2004, for example, Citibank N.A. reported 4 Call Report data, 4Q2004. See Appendix A for more detail. 5 Call Report data can be accessed on the FDIC's website at www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/. 6 For those attempting to find these items on the National Information Center (NIC) database, the relevant mnemonics are as follows: RC-C item 6.a is field RCON B538 and RC-C item 6.b is field RCON B539. 7 We believe that a third field should be included in this calculation: Schedule RC-S, item 6.a (Amount of ownership interests carried as: Securities) (NIC field RCFD B762). This field includes credit card balances held on a bank's balance sheet by way of an ownership interest in its own asset-backed securities. In general, a bank that relies on off-balance-sheet financing retains an interest in the credit card loans it sells to its off-balance-sheet trust in order to mitigate investors' exposure to risk and to make it easier to do future securitizations. The vast majority of banks retain this interest, commonly referred to as the seller's interest, in the form of on-balance-sheet credit card loans reported on schedule RC-C. A very small minority of card issuers, however, retain this interest in the form of certificated securities. These securities, which are reported in different ways on schedule RC-B, are best accounted for using item 6.a on schedule RC-S. Board staff do not include this field in their calculation because it could potentially include foreign loans. Based on our analysis, however, this has not historically been a problem. Data for on-balance-sheet credit cards and related plans can be found on the H.8 in item 10.a. on pages 7 and 10. 12 As we understand it, to calculate a monthly estimate in the absence of Call Report data, Board staff calculate a month-over-month growth rate using H.8 data. Because of week-to-week fluctuations in these data, however, the Board does not simply use the H.8 data point closest to the end of the month for the growth rate calculation. Instead, it uses a weighted average of the four weeks of H.8 data points surrounding the end of the month (i.e., the two data points preceding the end of the month and the two data points following the end of the month). The weeks immediately bracketing the end of the month are weighted 0.375 each and the weeks on either side of the bracketing weeks are weighted 0.125 each. For example, to calculate the weighted average for February, the second to last week of February and the second week of March are weighted 0.125 each and the last week of February and the first week of March are weighted 0.375 each. Board staff then apply this growth rate to the most recently available Call Report total. For example, if March Call Report data are the most recent available and Board staff are trying to estimate a commercial bank total for June, they calculate monthly growth rates from March to June using the H.8 and apply these rates to the March Call Report data. (Note: The H.8 does include a monthly estimate, but Board staff do not rely on it because it represents an average for the month, not an end-ofmonth estimate.) 13 Off-balance-sheet credit card data were reported on the two lines labeled 33a on page 13 of the January 7, 2005 H.8 release. This release is available at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/20050107/. 14 We believe that the Board derives end-of-month off-balance-sheet estimates from H.8 data using the weighting process described in footnote 12.
H.8 data are based on a survey completed by voluntary reporters among commercial banks. As explained above, these volunteers are divided into two groups: large and small. 15 The entire universe of large banks participates in the survey. 16 As a result, the H.8's off-balance-sheet estimate for large banks, of which there are currently 29, is simply equal to the sum of these banks' off-balance-sheet card loans (from line M.7.a of form FR 2416).
Calculating the H.8's off-balance-sheet estimate for small banks is slightly more complicated. Approximately 1,000 of the approximately 7,500 small commercial banks complete the weekly survey, which includes a question about off-balance-sheet loans to individuals made through credit cards and related plans (line M.3.a of form FR 2644). As a result, data collected from survey participants must be adjusted in order to approximate the entire small bank universe.
To accomplish this, Board staff add data collected from respondents to the weekly survey to data collected from nonrespondents on the most recent quarterly Call Reports (schedule RC-S, column C, item 1). When two consecutive quarters of Call Report data are available, Board staff interpolate weekly data for the nonrespondents using the two available quarterly estimates as starting and ending points.
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If a small and large bank merge or if a commercial bank acquires assets from or transfers assets to a noncommercial-bank entity, Board staff adjust the G.19 inputs accordingly.
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Appendix B contains an estimate of the of the off-balance-sheet card loans held by commercial banks. We constructed our estimate using publicly available Call Report data, 15 The distinction between large and small banks is not straightforward, since bank characteristics other than asset size are involved. For an explanation of how banks are classified for the purposes of the H. While the extent to which these entities rely on finance companies to extend revolving credit is unclear, we know that these corporate parents play a significant role in the consumer revolving sector.
Unlike commercial banks, finance companies do not have uniform regulatory reporting requirements. As a result, the G.19's estimates of finance companies' on-and off-balance-sheet revolving loans rely on three rounds of confidential surveys that finance companies complete including the trade press, to approximate the size of off-balance-sheet activities.
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As of December 2004, the G.19 estimated that savings banks managed $15 billion in offbalance-sheet revolving loans. 34 While we were not successful in our attempts to create our own estimate of this segment, 35 we suspect that most of the securitization activity in this sector involves the largest card issuers: USAA, GE Capital, American Express, and Capital One. Many of these institutions, however, lend through a variety of entities, including commercial banks and finance companies, and isolating the savings bank portion of off-balance-sheet loans is not possible using SEC filings or other public data.
E. Nonfinancial Businesses
Over the past three years, the acquisition of retailers' portfolios by banks and finance companies has significantly affected the extent to which nonfinancial businesses participate in the market for consumer credit. From December 2002 to November 2005, for example, on-balance- 33 Using issuance data to estimate the size of off-balance-sheet portfolios is tricky. Taking the sum of all issuance activity for a particular credit card issuer would likely overstate the issuer's off-balance-sheet outstandings. This is the case because securitization deals eventually wind down and the outstandings associated with such deals return to the balance sheet of the issuer (to potentially be securitized again). Given this, to accurately estimate off-balance-sheet outstandings, one would have to estimate how much issuance volume has reverted back to the issuer and subtract the sum of such volume from the sum of the issuer's total issuance. Issuance data can also be misleading because card issuers typically carry an ownership interest in a securitization deal on their balance sheet. For this reason, including the entire issuance amount in the estimation would overstate the off-balance-sheet total by any amount held by the card issuer. 34 Board of Governors, unpublished estimate. 35 We were unable to infer information from regulatory reporting forms and the recent editions of Inside MBS and ABS to which we gained access contained no apparent credit-card-related data on savings banks. portfolios and, as a result, must be estimated using other data. 43 Staff preparing the G.19 also monitor the trade press and SEC filings to ensure that they appropriately track sales of nonfinancial businesses' portfolios and any nonfinancial businesses that enter the consumer lending market during the year.
Estimating the size of store-and gas-card portfolios monthly is difficult because data on these portfolios are published annually and are not available until many months after the end of the year. After two consecutive years of data are available on these portfolios through Nilson, 
III. Improving the Estimate of Consumer Revolving Credit
Having described the inputs, calculation methods, and complexities of the G.19's estimate of revolving consumer credit, we now discuss how the estimate might be improved or made more useful to those who rely on it. Our analysis proceeds in two steps: First, we define the characteristics common to estimations we find the most valuable. Second, we evaluate the current estimate of revolving consumer credit in light of these characteristics and pose five questions.
These questions contemplate ways in which the collection, manipulation, and presentation of the revolving consumer credit estimate might be improved.
The challenges confronting a researcher seeking to estimate U.S. revolving consumer credit are no different from those confronting other researchers seeking to measure national activities that span multiple providers and products and for which existing data are imperfect.
Given this, it is helpful to consider in the abstract what makes any estimate on which researchers rely highly valuable. Upon reflection, we discovered that the estimates from which we derive the most value have at least three characteristics in common: First, they rely on data that researchers would otherwise find costly to use. Rather than simply repackaging existing and well-understood data, ideal estimates incorporate data that are expensive because of their direct costs or the vast amount of time required to understand their intricacies. Second, ideal estimates leverage the unique or unusual capacities of the organization or researcher that produces them. Estimates that rely on in-depth industry knowledge, special relationships, access to nonpublic information, or uncommon skills are vastly more valuable than those that do not. Finally, highly valuable estimates are available historically and, when possible, disaggregated, yielding to both quick analysis and in-depth exploration. They download easily, use segmentations that are logical and insightful, and remain stable and continuous over time.
In evaluating the characteristics of estimates we find helpful, it would be shortsighted not to consider the perspectives of those entities on which the burden of filling out forms and surveys falls. Ideally, data from private businesses on which estimates are based would serve some purpose not related to the estimate, since weekly, monthly, and quarterly reporting is expensive.
In the context of the G.19, researchers must consider the costs financial institutions would face if a reporting form were modified or expanded to gather data not otherwise needed for regulating financial entities or conducting monetary policy.
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Understanding the characteristics common to well-regarded estimates and the burdens that reporting forms can impose on reporting entities, we pose the following five questions that aim to improve the estimate's usefulness.
Should the G.19 measure consumer debt instead of consumer credit?
The official title of the G.19 statistical release is "Consumer Credit," not "Consumer
Debt" because G.19 estimates include some short-term extensions of credit on which no interest is assessed, such as those made to consumers who regularly pay their credit card balances in full.
Consumer debt, on the other hand, is a subset of consumer credit. It includes only those extensions of credit that the consumer plans to pay back over time. In most cases, these long-term extensions are subject to interest charges.
For researchers, the distinction between debt and short-term credit is an important one.
Debt enables consumers to buy goods and services that are otherwise unaffordable and pay for them out of future income. Therefore, debt affects present and future consumer spending, consumers' ability to respond to financial shocks, and the incidence of bankruptcy. In contrast,
short-term extensions of credit are of less economic consequence, generally existing to make the acquisition of goods and services more convenient.
Researchers who rely on the G.19 do so because it is a good proxy for consumer debt, not because it is a good measure of total consumer credit. Those who designed the G.19 seemed to recognize this and, therefore, included short-term extensions of credit only to the extent to which they are commingled with consumer debt (as they are with respect to credit cards). Consider, for example, the value of all the goods and services provided to consumers on credit that is not captured on the G.19. It is not uncommon for companies that provide consumers with telephone service, Internet service, energy, water, or cable television to extend 30 days of credit -the same extended to most users of nonrevolving credit cards. If these forms of credit were included in the G.19, the release would lose much of its value, since it could no longer be used as a proxy for consumer debt. Given this, we suggest that the Federal Reserve consider the advantages and disadvantages of removing short-term credit extensions from the G.19. the accuracy of such an estimate less than reliable. 47 Despite the potential problems with QRCC data, we believe that the Federal Reserve should at least consider whether the data in its current form could help researchers better approximate the consumer debt portion of the G.19.
Alternatively, if the data collected on the QRCC data are deemed not sufficiently reliable for the purpose of estimating consumer debt, the Federal Reserve could amend the QRCC reporting form by replacing the two balance-related items above with items that would permit the accurate measurement of pay-in-full balances. 48 We do not recommend this change lightly. However, we believe that the value of a change to the QRCC reporting form to improve the measure of consumer debt probably outweighs the costs associated with such a change.
Given the consolidation in the consumer revolving sector, are there more useful ways to disaggregate revolving credit data?
As discussed in the previous section, G.19 estimates of revolving consumer credit are segmented by credit type (i.e., commercial bank credit, credit union credit, finance company credit, etc.). These segments are logical, since they are largely based on distinctions important to banking regulators and generally reflect the various avenues by which Board staff collect consumer credit data. In addition, since these segments can be applied to revolving and nonrevolving types of credit, they permit further aggregation of consumer credit totals.
Despite these advantages, we believe that the current segmentation scheme is losing its value with respect to revolving consumer credit. In January 1990, when the credit card industry was relatively young, there was much competition in the revolving credit industry by lender type. 47 Some balances reported by issuers as not having been assessed interest, Johnson argues, belong to customers that recently started using their card. These customers have not yet received their first bill and, therefore, have not yet had a chance to signal whether they are long-term borrowers or convenience users. In addition to this problem, we believe that the popularity of 0 percent APR offers in the early part of this decade could skew QRCC data. 48 The report form could be amended, for example, by replacing lines 6 and 7 (which, we believe, are not currently used for other regulatory or statistical purposes) with the following: (i) the sum of average daily balances of all accounts with an opening balance greater than zero where the sum of payments made during the month on the account are greater than or equal to the account's beginning balance; and (ii) the sum of average daily balances of all accounts with an opening balance greater than zero.
Commercial banks controlled about two-thirds of the revolving credit market, nonfinancial businesses controlled almost a quarter, and other noncommercial-bank entities controlled approximately 13 percent. Today, because of consolidation, commercial banks hold over 80 percent of all revolving consumer loans, and no other single type of lender holds more than 8 percent. (See Appendix F for charts depicting this change.) Consequently, the current segmentation scheme is converging upon a single segment and its usefulness, one could argue, is limited to illustrating the increasing dominance of commercial banks in this sector.
We propose that the Federal Reserve consider increasing the value of the revolving credit data by segmenting it other ways (in addition to the lender type). Disaggregating data by credit term (e.g., short-term credit vs. debt), product type (e.g., general purpose credit card vs. storecard vs. noncard revolving), or market share (e.g., top 10 lenders vs. top 100 lenders vs. all lenders) would provide researchers with additional insights into this industry's organization, structure, and marketing practices. We believe that these additional segments could be implemented without much cost, since much of the data the Federal Reserve System collects is already formatted in a way that would permit such segmentation. Overall, these segmentations would more fully leverage the System's unique and confidential data and provide researchers with valuable information about the revolving credit market.
Should the data on securitized pools be reported on a disaggregated basis?
At present, the G.19 does not disaggregate estimates of off-balance-sheet revolving loans by lender type. But since off-balance-sheet loans comprise nearly 50 percent of all revolving loans and off-balance-sheet data are (and have been) collected and stored by lender type, segmenting off-balance-sheet loans in this way would cost very little. Such information would make the data more useful to researchers attempting to estimate revolving credit market shares by lender type and measure lender reliance on the capital markets for financing. Such information would also be useful because it is gathered from sources to which most researchers do not have access.
A pie chart that segments the $380.8 billion in off-balance-sheet revolving loans as of December 2004 by lender type can be found in Appendix G.
Should other data sources be used to help ensure the continued accuracy of the consumer revolving estimate?
Board staff preparing the G.19 rely on nearly one dozen different sources of data in an attempt to cover the spectrum of lenders and products that make up the consumer revolving loan market. We believe that the vast majority of these sources are highly reliable, since they incorporate data collected and validated by federal regulators from institutions that have significant incentives to accurately report their financial condition. There are, however, lending institutions that operate outside the traditional banking infrastructure. Finance companies, retailers, casinos, and brokerage firms, for example, extend revolving credit to their customers, but they are generally not required to separately report this activity to federal regulators. In addition, traditional lenders may innovate and account for lending in a way not captured by the existing regulatory reporting structure. A historical example of this is how lenders began securitizing their credit card loans in the 1980s. To stay abreast of lending activities that occur via less traditional avenues or outside the scope of regulatory reports, staff that prepare the G.19
informally rely on a variety of sources, including industry trade press and news services, to spot emerging credit forms and new players in the revolving credit market.
In addition to using these sources, we suggest that Board staff investigate the use of other, relatively new sources of data that might help inform them about emerging trends in the credit market. 
IV. Conclusion
This paper explained in detail the challenges associated with estimating consumer revolving credit. Furthermore, it examined the disparate sources of information on which the estimate is based. These sources include mandatory regulatory reports, voluntary surveys, and public trade publications. The paper also examined the various data used to derive the estimate. In general, these data are inconsistent, measuring different sectors' activities with different frequency, and they are subject to continuous revision. The paper also described a range of sampling and estimation techniques on which the G.19 relies. Overall, it is clear from this 49 Alternatively, all noncard revolving loans could be included with nonrevolving loans on the G.19, and the release's labels could be changed to reflect this.
analysis that the resource-intensive task of estimating consumer credit involves both science and art.
Despite the challenges associated with the consumer revolving estimate, it is highly accurate and reliable. Much of the data on which it is based is validated by statisticians familiar with each reporting institution's unique practices. In addition, many of the institutions providing the data for the estimate do so under the accuracy and honesty requirements of federal law.
Revisions to underlying data are immediately reflected on the G.19 website, and those preparing the estimate take great care to ensure its consistency and stability.
Given the thorough efforts of those preparing the G.19, the considerations we raise relate more to the usefulness than to the accuracy of the consumer revolving estimate. We suggest five ideas for the Federal Reserve to consider. Three of these ideas relate to how the consumer revolving data are presented. We suggest exploring whether data can be segmented into credit and debt segments, whether the off-balance-sheet segments can be made publicly available, and whether there are other useful ways of displaying credit data (e.g., by product type or institution size) that would be easy to implement. The other two ideas relate to improving the estimation process. We suggest that the Federal Reserve consider whether an adjustment should be made to account for noncard revolving loans and whether other data sources might help Board staff spot emerging credit products and providers. 
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Source: Call Report Data (RCON B707).
(1) Using data from MBNA's 2004 Annual Report, we adjusted its securitized loan total (from $81.2 billion to $66.2 billion) to account for its foreign credit card loan securitization activity. (2) Using the ratio of domestic to foreign credit card loans from Capital One's Call Report, we adjusted its securitized loan total (from $37.7 billion to $28.9 billion) to account for its foreign credit card loan securitization activity. (3) The $11 billion difference between the G.19 estimate and our estimate is most likely due to differences in estimation technique. See Section II.A for more details. 
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